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Explaining opposition to refugee resettlement: The role
of NIMBYism and perceived threats
Jeremy Ferwerda,1* D.J. Flynn,2* Yusaku Horiuchi1,2*†
One week after President Donald Trump signed a controversial executive order to reduce the influx of refugees to
the United States, we conducted a survey experiment to understand American citizens’ attitudes toward refugee
resettlement. Specifically, we evaluated whether citizens consider the geographic context of the resettlement
program (that is, local versus national) and the degree towhich they are swayed bymedia frames that increasingly
associate refugees with terrorist threats. Our findings highlight a collective action problem: Participants are
consistently less supportive of resettlement within their own communities than resettlement elsewhere in the
country. This pattern holds across all measured demographic, political, and geographic subsamples within our
data. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that threatening media frames significantly reduce support for both
national and local resettlement. Conversely, media frames rebutting the threat posed by refugees have no sig-
nificant effect. Finally, the results indicate that participants in refugee-dense counties are less responsive to
threatening frames, suggesting that proximity to previously settled refugees may reduce the impact of perceived
security threats.
INTRODUCTION
On27 January 2017, PresidentDonaldTrump signed an executive order
that temporarily barred citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries
from entering the United States, suspended refugee admissions for
120 days, and banned Syrian refugees from entering the United States
indefinitely. After a federal court blocked the order, President Trump
issued a revised version on 6March 2017. These orders sharply reversed
the expansion in refugee admissions under the Obama Administration.
Moreover, they elevated the U.S. refugee resettlement program into the
global spotlight and contributed to an international debate overwhether
to expand or curtail refugee admissions (1, 2).
Despite the contemporary relevanceof refugeepolicy, ourunderstand-
ing of the factors that shape public attitudes toward resettlement
programs remains incomplete. Although a growing social science liter-
ature investigates public attitudes toward refugees or asylum seekers
(1, 3–7), few studies directly examine the factors that shape citizens’
opposition to resettlement programs (rather than refugees or asylum
seekers as persons) or leverage experimental designs. This study ad-
dresses these gaps by implementing a survey experiment to evaluate
two factors hypothesized to shape public support for resettlement
programs: not-in-my-back-yard syndrome (NIMBYism) and media
framing.
First, given that the economic and cultural impacts of refugee reset-
tlement are distributed spatially, we investigate whether public support
varies by the geographic location of potential resettlement. According to
the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s (ORR) Annual Report to Congress
(8), refugees are now placed in 232 metropolitan areas across the
United States. While humanitarian values may lead many citizens to
support refugee resettlement in principle, conflicts between self-
interest and societal interest may arise in directly affected localities.
These spatial collective action problems—generally referred to as
NIMBYism—occur when people oppose developments in their vicin-
ity despite accepting the necessity for such developments elsewhere
(9–13). Although traditionally limited to physical facilities (for exam-
ple, nuclear power plants), NIMBYism has increasingly been used as a
theoretical framework to understand attitudes toward service provision,
including asylum centers (14–16). Our survey experiment investigates
whether participants display a pattern consistent with this collective
action problem, namely, reduced support for local resettlement relative
to resettlement elsewhere in the country.
Second, we examine the influence of media frames that depict refu-
gees as threatening or nonthreatening to national security. An extensive
body of literature has documented that media coverage often depicts
refugees as threats to public safety, health, local economies, and culture
(3, 17–20). In framing the executive order, President Trump explicitly
invoked refugees as a threat to national security—a frame that was
subsequently reinforced by media coverage, which highlighted the
large number of Muslims admitted under the auspices of the refugee
program. In response, pro-refugee advocates have spent considerable
effort attempting to rebut the claim that refugees undermine security.
However, extant studies have not used experimental designs to exam-
ine the extent to which these frames affect support for resettlement.
We expect that threatening and counterthreatening frames may be es-
pecially consequential in shaping attitudes toward refugee resettlement
because public knowledge about refugee-related programs is low (21),
citizens often hold competing considerations on these issues [see p. 61
of Druckman et al. (22)], and such frames often emphasize threats to
personal safety (23).
In addition to examining the effects of NIMBYism and media
frames on public support for refugee resettlement, we also investigate
whether spatial proximity to previously settled refugees moderates
either of these effects. Research suggests that citizens in diversifying
areas aremore likely to adopt xenophobic attitudes when immigration
is nationally salient (24, 25), and reactions to refugee resettlement also
appear to be sensitive to local context (26–29). More broadly, an ex-
tensive body of literature suggests that local intergroup contact—and
the cooperation or conflict that ensues—shapes subsequent attitudes
toward outgroups such as refugees (30–38). However, we are not
aware of any existing study that examines whether intergroup contact
conditions responsiveness tomedia coverage. Thus, we investigate the
potential moderating role of spatial proximity using data from the
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ORR (8). Specifically, we divide study participants into those living in
counties with high refugee density and those living in counties with
low refugee density (as defined by the ORR) and examine whether
treatment effects vary across these subgroups.
DESIGN AND RESULTS
We fielded a preregistered survey experiment 1 week after the first ex-
ecutive order. Participants were randomly assigned into one of three
conditions. In the first condition, which serves as the control, partici-
pants did not read any news coverage. Participants in the two treat-
ment groups read an excerpt fromanews article focusing on the extent
to which refugees are linked to terrorism. The first treatment, which
we refer to as the threatening frame, was entitled “Islamic State finds
success infiltrating its terrorists into refugee flows to West.” This arti-
cle states that terrorists “inflict refugee flows to the West with mass
killers” and subsequently mentions both recent terrorist attacks in
the United States and President Trump’s executive order to ban im-
migration from “high-risk Muslim-majority countries.” The second
treatment, which we refer to as the counterthreatening frame, was
published on the same day. It was entitled “How many fatal terror
attacks have refugees carried out in the US? None.” As the title sug-
gests, the article attempts to rebut the claim that refugees pose security
threats. Thus, it represents a “counterframe” (39).
After reading one (or neither) of these media frames, participants
recorded their support for national and local resettlement in two
separate questions (order randomized). These questions asked parti-
cipants to indicate their preferences for future resettlement on a scale
from 0 to 10. Specifically, participants were asked, “Do you support or
oppose refugee resettlement in [your local community/the United
States]? Suppose that people who feel that absolutely no refugees
should be placed in [your local community/the United States] are at
one end of a scale, at point 0; and others who feel that asmany refugees
as possible should be placed in [your local community/the United
States] are at the other end, at point 10. Where would you place
YOURSELF on this scale?” If people did not demonstrate attitudes
consistent with NIMBYism (that is, if people expressed, on average,
similar willingness to accept refugees across spatial contexts), we
would not expect to observe a substantial difference between these
two questions.
Not-in-my-back-yard syndrome
We first assess general support for refugee resettlement within our
sample by calculating the average level of support for both forms of
resettlement among participants in the control group (that is, under
no exposure to media frames). Pooling the national and local re-
settlement measures, we find that the mean support for resettlement
on the 11-point scale is 5.29 (SE = 0.05). To identify which types of
participants are supportive of each form of resettlement, we estimate
two ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models (table S1). Sev-
eral variables significantly predict support for resettlement. Female
participants are more supportive of each form of resettlement than
male participants (b = 0.46, SE = 0.21 for local resettlement; b = 0.43,
SE = 0.21 for national resettlement). More educated participants are
also more supportive than less educated participants (b = 0.65, SE =
0.23 for local resettlement; b=0.62, SE= 0.22 for national resettlement).
There are also clear partisan differences in support. Compared to in-
dependents, Democrats are more supportive of refugee resettlement
(b = 2.40, SE = 0.24 for local resettlement; b = 2.30, SE = 0.23 for
national resettlement) whereas Republicans are less supportive (b =
−2.11, SE = 0.30 for local resettlement; b = −2.27, SE = 0.28 for national
resettlement).
However, more relevant to our analysis is the extent to which sup-
port for resettlement varies by spatial context. Consistent with our
expectation, support for local resettlement is lower than support for
national resettlement (difference, −0.28; t = −11.33). This finding in-
dicates that participants are consistently less willing to accept refugees
in their local communities compared to elsewhere in the country. Al-
though the estimate is statistically significant, the difference in support
may initially appear small. However, an effect of this size is under-
standable given the hypothetical nature of our experiment and the
possibility of social desirability bias.
One might expect NIMBYism to be more prevalent among partic-
ular sociodemographic profiles. Yet our analysis suggests that this col-
lective actionproblem is nearly universal across demographic, political,
and geographic subsamples in our data. As shown inTable 1, the extent
Table 1. Reduced level of support for local refugee resettlement is
associated with neither individual-level variables nor location-specific
variables. Only respondents in the control group in our experiment
are included. Cell entries represent OLS coefficients, with SEs in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the difference between the level of support
for local resettlement and the level of support for national resettlement. The
level of support ranges from 0 (“absolutely no refugees”) to 10 (“as many
refugees as possible”). The omitted reference group for partisanship is
independent.
Model
1 2 3
Individual-specific
variables
Above median age 0.068 (0.098) 0.108 (0.104)
Female 0.027 (0.096) 0.043 (0.101)
Bachelor’s degree
or higher
0.026 (0.104) 0.031 (0.111)
Non-Hispanic white 0.025 (0.117) 0.010 (0.125)
Above median
income
0.077 (0.104) 0.032 (0.109)
Employed −0.145 (0.122) −0.105 (0.127)
Democrat 0.099 (0.108) 0.088 (0.115)
Republican 0.152 (0.133) 0.154 (0.139)
Location-specific
variables
Refugee-dense
county
0.053 (0.105) 0.082 (0.108)
Census population 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Population density −0.006 (0.008) −0.005 (0.008)
Unemployment rate 0.015 (0.013) 0.015 (0.014)
Constant −0.432 (0.169) −0.562 (0.141) −0.689 (0.234)
Number of
observations
740 709 678
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of NIMBYism is not associated with the demographic or political
attributes of participants. Similarly, an examination of location-specific
variables suggests that NIMBYism is not strongly correlated with local
population size, population density, unemployment rates, or whether a
county has a high density of previously resettled refugees. Moreover,
a joint test indicates that a fully saturated model including all these
covariates has nopredictive power (F statistic = 0.59,P=0.85). Although
we cannot isolate the specific mechanism driving reduced support for
local resettlement, the tendency towardNIMBYismdoes not appear to
be rooted in either particular backgrounds of citizens or pragmatic
concerns for local capacity.
Perceived threats
We next turn to the effects of media frames on attitudes toward re-
settlement. Before estimating framing effects, we verified the success
of our treatments with manipulation checks that examined percep-
tions of refugee threat across experimental conditions (table S2). Com-
pared to participants in the control group, participants who were
presented with the threatening frames were more likely to report that
refugees pose a threat to the United States. By contrast, participants
whowere presentedwith the counterthreatening frameswere less likely
to consider refugees a threat compared to the control group. Both
effects are statistically significant at conventional levels (see additional
manipulation checks in table S2). These results suggest that our treat-
ments successfullymanipulated the perceived threat posed by refugees.
But do these frames influence opinions toward refugee resettlement?
The experimental results suggest that threatening media frames
play a key role in shaping opposition to resettlement (table S3). As seen
in the top panel of Fig. 1, threatening frames reduce support for both
national and local resettlement. Relative to the control group, parti-
cipants who were exposed to the threatening frame were 0.55 points
(SE = 0.17) less supportive of national resettlement and 0.43 points
(SE = 0.17) less supportive of local resettlement. The effects of the
counterthreatening frames are more modest: Compared to the con-
trol group, participants exposed to the counterthreatening frames
were 0.18 points (SE = 0.17) more supportive of national resettlement
and 0.25 points (SE = 0.17) more supportive of local resettlement.
Although these effects are in the expected direction, both are in-
significant at conventional levels.
We also observe individual-level heterogeneity in responsiveness to
media frames. The bottom panel of Fig. 1 displays treatment effect esti-
mates among participants in high–refugee density counties and those in
low–refugee density counties (also see tables S4 and S5). Our results in-
dicate that spatial context may influence responsiveness tomedia frames.
As shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 1, although threatening frames re-
duce support for resettlement among participants in low–refugee density
counties (red dots), these frames have no detectable effects on the atti-
tudes of participants in high–refugee density communities (blue dots).
In tables S4 and S5, we show that this effect is particularly pronounced
among Republicans. When Republicans in low–refugee density
counties are exposed to the counterthreatening frame, their support
for refugee resettlement decreases (that is, it moves in the opposite di-
rection of the frame). By contrast, Republicans in high–refugee density
counties increase their support for resettlement after reading the coun-
terthreatening frame. These findings are consistentwith recent research,
which suggests that proximity to refugees moderates negative atti-
tudes (40, 41). However, given that respondent location is not ran-
domly assigned, themoderating effect should be viewed as suggestive
and should be examined further in future research.
DISCUSSION
This study identifies two factors that undermine public support for the
refugee resettlement program. First, our results highlight a collective
action problem: Participants are consistently more supportive of na-
tional refugee resettlement than resettlement in their local commu-
nities. NIMBYism is apparent among participants of different political
and demographic backgrounds and geographic contexts. This collective
National resettlement Local resettlement
−1 0 1 −1 0 1
−1 0 1 −1 0 1
Counterthreatening frame
Threatening frame
All
National resettlement Local resettlement
Counterthreatening frame
Threatening frame Refugee density
High
Low
Fig. 1. Framing effects on support for national and local refugee settlement. Estimated effects are based on OLS regression. The dependent variable is support for
national or local refugee resettlement, ranging from 0 (“absolutely no refugees”) to 10 (“as many refugees as possible”). The control group (no media frames) serves as
the baseline. (Top) All observations. (Bottom) Subgroup treatment effects. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
S C I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
Ferwerda, Flynn, Horiuchi, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1700812 6 September 2017 3 of 6
 o
n
 Septem
ber 12, 2018
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
action problem is likely to become more pronounced if the Trump
Administration continues to emphasize the potential costs of refugee
resettlement in Americans’ local communities. Although current law
provides states and municipalities with limited recourse to veto refu-
gee assignment, President Trump’s recent executive order instructs
the Department of Homeland Security to consider implementing a
system in which localities may opt out of resettlement (Section 5g).
If such a system is established, our results suggest that the resettlement
program will likely encounter profound challenges in distributing re-
fugees across the country.
Second, we find that media frames depicting refugees as threatening
to national security, which are increasingly common in Western de-
mocracies (42), can significantly reduce support for resettlement.
Moreover, frames that attempt to rebut the proposed security threat
with counterarguments did little to boost support for the resettlement
program. This finding is consistent with past framing experiments,
which reported large effects of negative frames about immigrants and
weaker effects of positive frames (43).More broadly, this asymmetry is
consistent with the extensive literature on negativity bias in infor-
mation processing (44) and attempts to rebut previously encountered
claims (39, 45). In this light, our results provide clear evidence that
pro-resettlement advocatesmay bewise to focus their appeals on other
considerations (for example, humanitarianism) rather than directly
attempting to refute security arguments.
Finally, our results suggest that local proximity to previously settled
refugees might mitigate the effects of threatening frames. Although
this finding does not imply that proximity necessarily engenders sup-
port for resettlement, as predicted by contact theory, it does suggest
that citizens living in refugee-dense areas may be less likely to react
to negativemedia coverage of refugees. Given that theU.S. refugee pro-
gram has successfully placed individuals in American communities
since 1980, citizens in affected locales appear to recognize that alleged
security threats may be overstated.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental design
We fielded our survey experiment from7February to 10 February 2017.
Participants were recruited from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk), an online labor market that is increasingly being used in
social science research (46). Although MTurk samples are not na-
tionally representative, scholars have successfully replicated canon-
ical experimental findings, including framing effects, using MTurk
samples (47–49). MTurk is especially attractive for our study because
it allowed us to rapidly field the experiment while the executive order
was being widely debated. Moreover, our sample contained variance
on a theoretically relevant moderating variable (that is, high refugee
density versus low refugee density), increasing our confidence in the
generalizability of treatment effect estimates (50). Table S6 presents
descriptive statistics for our sample.
Data collection occurred in two waves. First, on 1 February 2017,
we recruited a sample of 2994 respondents in the United States to
complete a preliminary survey containing standard demographic,
political, and geographic questions (see the SupplementaryMaterials
for details). Using self-reported zip codes, we coded whether indivi-
duals lived in a county with a large refugee population, drawing on
data from theORR (8). Next, we recontacted participants 6 days after
the initial wave to invite them to participate in a short follow-up that
contained the experiment. Participants were paid US$1.25 for com-
pleting the preliminary survey and US$0.40 for the follow-up. In
total, 2295 participants took part in the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants read the
following information: “On Friday, January 27, 2017, President Donald
Trump signed an executive order which temporarily banned citizens
of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering
theU.S.; suspended refugee admissions for 120 days; and banned Syrian
refugees from entering the U.S. indefinitely. [Paragraph break] Please
carefully read the article on the next page, which was published on-
line on Sunday, January 29, 2017, and answer some questions on the
following pages.”
Participants in one of the two treatment groupswere then presented
with a media frame: the threatening frame or the counterthreatening
frame (see the Supplementary Materials for details). Both treatments
were excerpted from news articles that were published online on
29 January 2017. The threatening frame was from an article that
appeared in The Washington Times (http://go.shr.lc/2jkExEx). The
counterthreatening frame was from an article that appeared on
CNN’s website (http://cnn.it/2kgNJJh).
After reading their assigned treatment, participants were asked two
questions about national and local resettlement (order randomized).
See figs. S1 and S2 for question wordings.
Statistical analysis
Table 1 is based on anOLS regression using all study participants. The
dependent variable was the difference between the level of support for
local resettlement (0 to 10) and the level of support for national re-
settlement (0 to 10). All individual-level independent variables were
binary (see the Supplementary Materials for question wordings).
Figure 1 is based on a set of OLS regressions. In all models, the
dependent variable was the level of support for either local or national
resettlement (0 to 10). The two treatment variables were binary indi-
cators for whether the threatening frame or the counterthreatening
frame was assigned. The no-frame condition served as the baseline.
The top figures were based on regressions using all study participants.
The bottom figures were based on regressions using one of the two
subsets of study participants: those who are living in high–refugee
density counties (blue) and those who are living in low–refugee den-
sity counties (red). Zip code–level data (including measures of popu-
lation, population density, and unemployment) were from The
Splitwise Blog (51). Data on refugee density were from the ORR (8).
We verified the main results reported in Table 1 and Fig. 1 by ex-
cluding inattentive participants in the bottom 10th percentile of total
survey completion time (see table S7 and fig. S3).Our results remained
substantively the same after excluding inattentive participants.
Preregistration information
Our hypotheses were preregistered before we accessed the outcome
data (Experiments in Governance and Politics registration ID
20170207AA). Our preregistration plan indicated that we will report
between-subject NIMBYism estimates in the main text and report
within-subject estimates in an appendix. Although treatment effect
estimates were similar using both approaches, we chose to report
within-subject estimates in the main text because they offer two
key advantages. First, within-subject comparisons reduce measure-
ment error by accounting for individual-level heterogeneity in how
the response scale is interpreted. Second, this approach estimates
treatment effects with greater precision than the between-subject ap-
proach because the effective sample size is doubled (that is, because we
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can use participants’ answers to both questions). One potential con-
cern with within-subject comparisons is question order effects. Al-
though question order was randomized, we verified that the results
reported above were not affected by the order. When we controlled
the order in which participants answered the questions, the esti-
mated media framing effects remained almost exactly the same as
those reported above. This was unsurprising because both media
frames and the order of resettlement support measures were ran-
domly assigned.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/3/9/e1700812/DC1
Questions in preliminary survey
table S1. Support for local and national resettlement.
table S2. Manipulation checks.
table S3. Framing effects.
table S4. Heterogeneous effects of media frames (local resettlement).
table S5. Heterogeneous effects of media frames (national resettlement).
table S6. Sample characteristics.
table S7. Attentive subsample (replication of Table 1).
fig. S1. Measurement of outcome variables: Asking a question about support for local
resettlement first.
fig. S2. Measurement of outcome variables: Asking a question about support for national
resettlement first.
fig. S3. Attentive subsample (replication of Fig. 1).
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